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Delusion represents an exceptional test case for the principal categories 
of common sense and philosophical thought such as ‘reason’, ‘truth’, 
‘reality’. With the engagement of a hidden part of Freud’s legacy and the 
most discussed results of twentieth-century psychiatry, my aim will be to 
analyze its paradoxical forms and to shed light on the logics that underlie 
and orient its specific modalities of temporalization, conceptualization 
and argumentation. Delusion, then, has been traditionally interpreted as 
synonymous with irrationality (absurdity, groundlessness, error, chaos), 
whereas by contrast its mirror image, reason, has been defined in terms 
of evidence, demonstrability, truth and order. I will analyze and contrast 
their paradoxical definitions. 
 
Keywords: delusion, reason, logic, psychiatry, psychopathology, 
epistemology, passions, certainty. 
 
 
Delusion: A false belief based on incorrect inference 
about external reality that is firmly sustained despite 
what almost everyone else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or 
evidence of the contrary. 
 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-IV, 1994, p. 765) 
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1. With this talk I am continuing a research program that 
began with the study of passions, of traumas of memory, and, in 
general, of those phenomena in which abnormal forms of 
thought do not appear to enjoy the right of citizenship in the 
republic of rationality. From this perspective, I want to explore 
today, with the instruments of an ‘impure reason’, the field of 
delusion. Although there are delusions provoked by brain injury 
(Young 1998; Young 2000, 47-73) – for example the so-called 
Capgras delusion, according to which patients believe that 
someone close to them has been replaced by an impostor who 
looks like the replaced person – of course I am not going to 
address this problem in terms of pathology or physiology of 
brain. Likewise, I am not going to deal with delusions provoked 
by drugs (Henquet, Di Forti, Murray, Van Os, 2008, 268-279), 
as Luca or Guillermo would in case do. My approach is 
philosophical and logical, and, in this written paper it is also a 
little bit more technical than in my oral presentation. You have 
to consider it, therefore, as a mental exercise or as a very mild 
brainstorming. 
 
2. Why the delusional person believes in what for everyone 
else is the contrary of any logical line of reasoning and of any 
empirical evidence? What is it in delusion that persuades? Who 
is the hidden  sophist, who mixes the true with the false, deduces 
or infers the false from the true, while preserving (and even 
increasing) the subjective certainty of the false? In the course of 
delusion, we can easily observe that truth and certainty do not 
coexist: paradoxically, the more the delusional subject moves 
away from the core of truth, the more his false conviction is 
strengthened. With the subtle diplomacy of diversion, evidence 
operates in the delusional subject as much to conceal as to 
reveal. His psychic apparatus does not only raise smoke screens 
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or secrete ink, like cuttlefish, in order to hide from itself: to 
dazzle and confuse it also uses light. 
If the transmission of certainty can thus take place 
separately from that of truth, we are faced - in reverse - with the 
question raised by Descartes in the Regulae ad directionem 
ingenii: namely, how is it possible to transmit certainty on the 
basis of prime and irrefutable evidence. In Descartes evidence is 
transferred through the chain of proof in a way that is analogous 
to the passing of the torch, thus lending cohesion and correctness 
to the proof while making it possible for each one of us to 
understand and judge according to the lumen naturale, with 
nothing imposed by authority. The cogency and persuasiveness 
of the argumentation are given by the passage of the light of 
evidence through all its parts. 
 Delusion, instead, is a conflictual formation of 
compromise (logically insubstantial from the ‘normal’ 
standpoint but in fact extremely real) between a subjectively 
intolerable core of truth and an internal or external world felt to 
be unlivable. At the mercy of contradictory commands that 
compel him to know and not know, to speak and remain silent at 
one and the same time, the delusional subject attempts in vain to 
obey commands that are simply out of the question: he attempts 
to follow paradoxical orders that are analogous to asking a shy 
and uneasy person to be free and easy, or to the insomniac's 
inviting himself to sleep. This accounts for the apparent 
absurdity of delusion, in which one denies on the one hand what 
one affirms on the other. 
What he affirms derives sometimes from the authority of 
other voices (commenting, dialoguing, or echoing thought) that, 
detaching themselves from the ego, come to the subject from a 
distant past that is historical, familiar and individual. These are 
phantasmal voices of absence, of unreality - generally 
accusatory, unpleasant, mocking, tormenting or self-
congratulatory in tone - that are incapable of entering into 
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fruitful dialogue with the logic and the contents of the present. 
In “cries and whispers” they reproach and praise; they ratify and 
condemn words or behavior; they give sibylline orders and 
advice, saddling the delusional subject with the exhausting effort 
of interpretation. 
 The delusional subject is consequently torn between the 
need to manifest what torments him and the fear that, if he does, 
the nefas - that of which he must not speak but which oppresses 
and obsesses him - will be proclaimed. Comprehending the 
incomprehensible as if it were comprehensible, guessing what is 
behind the opaque glass of repression, solving the enigma that 
he himself - who was supposed to interpret it - has muddied: this 
becomes his absolute purpose in life, his wager (and a losing 
one, until he finds the strength to face his conflicts resolutely). 
The exaggerated evidence, the feeling of conviction and the 
substitutes of truth all provide delusion with the armor and the 
fanaticism to defend itself against any confutation. Delusion 
opposes logical cogency and normally interpreted perception 
with an inner experience of obligation, loyalty and fidelity to the 
created new world. Subjectively, for instance, the delusional 
person is quite right when he sees sense and intention in the 
apparently accidental behavior of others. He often has vision 
sharper than the normal mind, except that he overinterprets and 
displaces certainty at the cost of truth. 
 
3. Is there a kind of logic, although anomalous, that can 
explain why patients firmly believe in the contents of their 
delusions? Let us analyze some of the most interesting answers 
given, in particular, after the second haft of the Twentieth-
century. With the publication in 1956 of an article by Gregory 
Bateson and a group of his colleagues, schizophrenia and 
delusion began to be widely attributed to the effect of “double 
binds”; that is, to messages that cancel one another out or to 
orders that cannot be followed. For instance, when a mother 
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insists that she loves her child, but does not want to let him grow 
up as an independent person, the truth is that she “loves the child 
not mainly for his own sake but for hers.” In this way the child 
receives contradictory messages of the type: “I (don’t) love you” 
= “I (don’t) love myself” (Ciompi 1988, 16, 167 [It. transl.]). 
The paradoxicality of such messages may be summarized in the 
command “Be who you are not!” (Selvini Palazzoli et alii, 44), 
the exact opposite of the classical precept “Become that which 
you are!” formulated by Pindar and by Aristotle and later 
reproposed by Nietzsche. 
 The “sender” of this message - in this instance the mother - 
is, indeed, in the grip of narcissism, but of a lacerated and 
unhappy kind (in which love and hate are turned, 
simultaneously, towards the self and towards others). She thus 
transmits ambiguous signals of connivance and conflict to the 
“recipient.”  
 In technical terms, Bateson and his group are convinced 
that the schizophrenic individual also transgresses Russell’s 
theory of logical types, according to which there is a 
discontinuity between a class and its members: “The class 
cannot be a member of itself nor can one of the members be the 
class, since the term used for the class is of a different level of 
abstraction – a different Logical Type – from terms used for 
members” (Bateson et alii, 251, 254). To give a simple example: 
All cats are feline, but not all felines are cats. Consequently, 
whenever a double bind situation occurs, delusional individuals 
are unable to discriminate between logical types. 
 The logic of delusion is not the logic of that “common 
world” - shared by those who are awake - of which Heraclitus 
speaks; but neither is it the logic of an idios kosmos, of a private 
world of the individual, analogous to the world of dreams (as 
Binswanger 1993, 97-99 would have it, and as is generally 
believed). Delusion, rather, would appear to constitute a 
paradoxical intermediate world in which the public dimension 
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and the private one, the logic of the mind and the logic of 
passions, the correct perception and the hallucination, the 
prohibition and the fulfillment of wishes, the complete 
adaptation to and the absolute flight from the world all come 
together and intersect. It may be compared to a life parallel to 
our own or to the alphanumeric sequence of a safe: letters and 
numbers are common, known to one and all, but in this case 
their combination is specific. For that matter, when we all share 
a common language and a detailed system of the organization of 
experience - the fruit of traditions going back thousands of years 
- a wholly private world is unimaginable: even the most 
capricious and extravagant mental constructions are in fact 
composed of universally recognizable parts. 
 In delusion the will to strike up and to avoid relationships 
with others - to reveal and to conceal - clash and reconcile, 
giving rise to an allusive and initiatory style. For example, when 
the feeling of shame reaches a pathological stage (see Ballerini 
and Rossi Monti) in which the tendency to conceal is 
constitutive, the language of the delusional subject adequately 
expresses his divided and contradictory will to communicate and 
not to communicate. But even here detachment from the social 
dimension is not complete, as is shown, in other types of 
delusion, by the constant presence of conspirators, spies or 
slanderers. To admit their existence means, in fact, to maintain a 
slender thread of contact with the reality of others. 
 
 4. When we try to understand this problem, we find one 
obstacle blocking our way. It is represented by the incongruity 
of those who maintain that in the delusional subject the 
mechanisms of thought remain intact, because the delusional 
subject does attempt to give meaning to his landscape of ruins 
(Minkowski 1923, but also Jaspers, 97; Clérambault, 41). 
Consequently, according to them there is no essential difference 
between delusional thought processes and thought processes in 
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normal discourse and judgment. Now, it is true that the 
delusional subject has no clear perception of his contradictions 
as such, but does this mean they are not contained in the text of 
his delusion? Undoubtedly the delusional subject necessarily 
twists the generally accepted rules of reasoning. Even if, for the 
sake of argument, we grant that the elementary mechanisms of 
logical thought and of judgment remain intact – at least until the 
delusion becomes chronic – their way of functioning has been 
altered, both in the formation of concepts and in the 
development of discourse. 
The notion of “overinclusion,” first proposed by Cameron, 
thus appears particularly worthy of attention with regard to the 
formation concepts, even if it may need some correction (see 
Cameron 1944 and 1947). Overinclusive thought, frequent in 
acute schizophrenia, consists in the inability to choose the 
pertinent elements of a concept, eliminating the ones that are 
less relevant or completely unrelated. Let me give an example: 
placing “Saint Joseph”, who was a carpenter in the category 
“furniture” constitutes an overinclusion. Its complementary 
opposite is underinclusive thought, which can be found in cases 
of chronic schizophrenia, and where by contrast the conceptual 
range is restricted, such that the category “furniture” is applied 
to tables, but not to wardrobes or chests of drawers. 
In what way and to what extent, then, does the delusional 
subject stray from the correct form of defining concepts and of 
reasoning? Let us begin with definitions. If, for example, on the 
plane of elementary logic we wish to give the exact definition of 
"square," we say that it is a quadrilateral (next-highest class) 
with equal sides and angles (specific difference). We begin with 
the broader family of quadrilaterals and then we specify their 
types. If we were to affirm that the square is a geometrical figure 
we would be saying nothing false, but we would be using a far 
more general class (we would, in fact, be generic). If, by 
contrast, we just say that it is a quadrilateral with equal sides we 
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would not be specific, because rhombuses, too, have the same 
property. In the same way, if we just attribute it with equal 
angles, it would be no different from a rectangle. 
 Quite normal people too are often generic or not specific, 
be it out of ignorance (how can someone with an average 
education define an iguana or a meson if not, at best, as an 
exotic animal or a subatomic particle?), or laziness, or out of the 
implicit confidence that, in any case, they will be understood in 
everyday conversation. Still, they would never seriously include 
a four-sided stronghold, a square headed person or even a 
donkey among quadrilaterals, and never the rhombus but not the 
square. 
 Overinclusion implies, then, on one hand that the concept 
takes on a broader extension than is commonly accepted and, on 
the other, that within it subsidiary or inappropriate connotations 
are taken to be relevant. The two processes are complementary. 
If we hold the key to the specifics of the delusional subject's 
experience and to the relevant features of his culture, we are also 
well placed to understand how the elementary associative chain 
that generated the overinclusion “furniture / carpenter/ Saint 
Joseph” was formed. In this case he makes use - literally - of a 
metaphor, a “moving” of meanings, that leads - in our 
civilization based on Christianity - from furniture to Saint 
Joseph. In normal reasoning this association, were it ever to 
come to mind, would be taken as irrelevant or misleading for the 
purposes of normal communication (though conceivably of use 
in some witty remark). Delusion is, in this respect, highly 
metaphorical, for it pollinates and hybridizes unrelated (or very 
distantly related) ideas and images according to subjective 
analogical intentions, at times inadvertently producing poetic 
effects, but more often creating associations that are eccentric or 
absurd. 
 As Frith sees it, overinclusion derives, paradoxically, from 
the delusional subject’s hyperawareness. He is incapable of 
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filtering and processing that enormous flux of information which 
reaches him from the external and internal world and, above all, 
that surplus lying beneath the threshold of consciousness in the 
clinically sane and which, if it breaks through, is immediately 
eliminated or disregarded. Such a position is diametrically 
opposed to the hypothesis - which Jung took over from Pierre 
Janet, transforming it in the process - that in schizophrenia there 
is an abaissement du niveau mental to a “fatal extreme degree,” 
at the moment in which the individual enters into contact with 
the archetypes or the symbols of the collective unconscious, 
whose “flood” sweeps him away (see Jung 1939, and Jung 
1945). 
 Consequently, in Frith’s view, delusions are not the 
products of a troubled consciousness but the result of an 
unsuccessful attempt to interpret coherently the incoming 
collection of data. I would amend this hypothesis by adding that 
the flux is not entirely without filters. The filter changes: 
consciousness is ready and able to take in much of what is 
normally considered insignificant, but this surplus of data is 
assimilated according to other - lax but significant - criteria. It 
may even be said that logics of delusion are modeled on the 
form of these filters, which select significant experience and 
thought, making them pass through the bottleneck of 
consciousness. 
  
5. Let us now attempt to extend the validity of this modified 
notion of overinclusion from the sphere of conceptualization to 
other fields, and in particular to those of: discursive or 
syllogistic reasoning; the intersection between categories; and 
the contamination between regions of experience normally 
thought to be distant from or incompatible with one another. To 
gage the maturity of the results we have attained so far, I will 
refer to the theses of von Domarus, Arieti and Matte Blanco. 
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 For them the most striking anomaly of schizophrenic 
thought lies in the presence within it of a logic based on the 
identity of the predicates - and not of the subjects - of 
prepositions. Dogs and tables are thus considered similar on the 
basis of the common property of having four legs.  
 The fallacy “All Indians are fast; all deer are fast; all 
Indians are deer” (Arieti) depends technically on the lack of 
distribution of the middle term of a syllogism. In fact, “in a valid 
categorical syllogism, the middle term must be distributed in at 
least one of the two premises, and thus must appear either as the 
subject of an affirmative universal proposition or as the 
predicate of a negative particular proposition.” In this case, the 
middle term acts as predicate in both the major and the minor 
premise (and therefore functions neither as the subject of an 
affirmative universal proposition, nor as the predicate of a 
negative particular proposition). The predicate “fast,” including 
in the same manner both Indians and deer, thereby broaches 
their equivalence within the wider class of fast beings. Thus 
overinclusion now presents itself as the construction of a wider 
category capable of assimilating diverse categories on the basis 
of a common quality that connects them and makes them 
indistinguishable. 
 A logic of this kind, traced back by its expounders to the 
modus operandi of “primitive thought”, assumes that delusions 
are a form of regression to phases philogenetically and culturally 
surpassed, to “paleologic” thought. By the criteria of classical 
logic, the paleologic syllogism is incorrect. From the standpoint 
of the patient, however, it obeys another logic, at least the 
cognitive styles of which can be established: “As long as he 
interprets reality with Aristotelian logic, he is aware of the 
unbearable truth, and the state of panic persists. Once he sees 
things in a different way, with a new logic, his anxiety decreases 
or changes in character. This new logic either will permit him to 
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see reality as he wants to, or will offer him at least a partial 
pseudo-fulfillment of his wishes” (Arieti, 229). 
 In both cases the desire contained in delusion tears down 
the wall of the “contraddizion che nol consente” and makes its 
way towards the conciliation of the irreconcilable. The principle 
of omnipotence, the will to deny and the delight in denying 
common logic, takes the place of the principle of non-
contradiction. Desire tends no longer to recognize the aut-aut 
but only the vel...vel, the compatibility - in principle - of all with 
all. 
It is a condition that has its pleasant sides. As Jung recalls, 
“I once treated a schizophrenic girl who told me that she hated 
me because I made it [delusion] impossible. At the same time, 
however, the schizophrenic is an individual who has sought 
refuge from unbearable tension in his psychosis, but this has 
only created him more difficulties, in the end becoming both his 
prison and his undoing” (Ciompi 1988, 203 It. transl.). Delusion 
as an “insecurity exit” - an emergency exit in reverse, leading 
not away from but towards the emergency - distorts normal logic 
the more, the higher are the stakes for the delusional subject, and 
the more uncertain and frightening are his lot and prospects. 
 Von Domarus has been rightly criticized for his equating of 
delusional with primitive thought (see, for example, Piro, 240-
245, 530-532). It is true, however, that the limits of delusion are 
culturally determined, as are the limits of categorization and of 
the creation of taxonomies that are surprising at first blush, but 
which prove to be entirely coherent in their own way. As Lévi-
Strauss has remarked, it would seem absurd (or - for us - a 
glaring case of overinclusion) to put together, as the “savage 
mind” does in some cultures, “wild cherries, cinnamon, vanilla 
and sherry.” And yet chemical analysis shows that they “are 
grouped together by the intellect as well as the senses, because 
they all contain aldehyde” (Lévi-Strauss, 12 [It. transl.]). 
 
 12 
 6. The paleologic model does not hold up at the ontogenetic 
level either: in terms, that is, of individual regression to 
superseded stages of childhood or of adolescence. After 
Vygotskij’s attempt in his 1934 essay to equate the thinking of 
schizophrenics with that of adolescents, Cameron, in his 
experiments, demonstrated the insubstantiality of such 
conclusions: delusion, for Cameron, was not simply mental 
regression, but rather the break-up of an already developed 
structure. For that matter, G. E. Morselli formulated a theory in 
1948 that was diametrically opposed to the position of von 
Domarus: for Morselli delusion produces not a paleo- but a neo-
logic, “subordinated to paradoxical schemata of the processing 
of experience” and compared “to the planting of fresh 
vegetation” on the scorched earth of a burnt forest (Morselli, 297 
ff.; Stanghellini, 54-55). 
  The confusion of logical classes is one of the possible 
strategies the delusional subject adopts to resolve his aporias, 
but is not the only one. Distinguishing paranoiac delusions, 
which are well structured, from paranoid delusions, 
characterized by a loosening of logical connections (and without 
considering the affective side for now: the conversion of love 
into hate, for example), along with overinclusion, the paleologic 
syllogism and symmetry, there are other aspects - which I shall 
not dwell upon - that can define both delusional thought and 
language. Regarding thought, we have the following 
phenomena: violation of the principle of the excluded middle; 
interference between ideas; instability of associative 
connections; overflowing metaphor. Delusional language, in 
turn, is characterized by the following symptoms, among others: 
semantic distortion; fluctuation in the semantic fringe; phonetic 
alterations; neologisms; a “salad” or a carillon of words 
(Wortsalad and Wortklingel). Regarding the syntax of 
schizophrenics, with the exception of a few who are chronically 
ill, psycholinguists have reached a remarkable conclusion: 
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"schizophrenic language is not formally disturbed, and most 
investigators of its content have found that irrelevance rather 
than incompetence is the most characteristic feature" (Cutting, 
260) - which, by another route,  brings us back to the reasons for 
overinclusion in delusional thinking. 
 
 7. Delusion and hallucination, although unstable, do not 
simply (or not only) represent the result of a “degeneration” of 
cerebral tissues, as was widely believed in psychiatric circles in 
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, subjectively, they manifest 
an immense effort - the labor of Sisyphus - to remake and 
unmake the lost world, incessantly, making it livable, coherent 
and consistent from within by means of an induced and 
accelerated growth of its connective tissue. It is the whole 
universe as previously perceived, imagined, thought, enveloped 
in passions and desires that suddenly collapses and must 
therefore be rebuilt as soon as possible. The contents of delusion 
appear, at first blush, like tow or rags anxiously picked - 
however and wherever possible - to plug the leaks in the relation 
between the self and the world. And the fear of seeing life 
founder increases when one realizes that the cracks are 
concentrated at the very points where the dividing wall between 
subject and object is thinnest and most fragile. Ideas, 
perceptions, affects, persons, things, forced to abdicate their old 
meaning, are feverishly invested with new meanings and values. 
This comes about thanks to an ars combinatoria capable of 
quickly filling the voids provoked by abnormal experiences and 
of tamponing major hemorrhages of intelligibility, utilizing all 
the materials or splinters of reality to be met with in an adroitly 
tactical manner (and overinterpreting by compensation). 
 In normal thought too, the range of possible connections 
between ideas, sensations and fantasies is broad and indefinite. 
In fact they amount to thousands of permissible combinations 
and references. In delusion the trap is set by one or more 
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thematic cells, which develop a full and proper orchestration of 
delusion with multiform variations and plots. In principle they 
can be accounted for and listed, individuating a reliable 
repertory of themes and a grammar of motifs and matrices. 
These initial cells or “postulates” of delusion are - especially in 
the early stages - lively, lush, “florid” and virulent. In some 
ways they resemble cancer cells, their physical homologues, for 
their ability to multiply rapidly. 
 When coherence and evidence, normally considered signs 
of rationality, become ab-solutae, they constitute the most 
typical expression of delusion. This means, by contrast, that the 
idea of reason is bound up with local borders and with 
particularizing, pertinentizing exceptions, while that of delusion 
seems, rather, to be connected with the nonobservance of logical 
boundaries in the name of absolute coherence and evidence. 
‘Sane’ thought has learned to content itself with what is 
fragmentary and incomplete, sacrificing harmonies that are more 
complete and premature. 
With a provisional conclusion, my thesis is that the most 
significant difference between common logic and delusion 
seems to lie in the fact that the former sets limits and restraints 
to “reason,” while the latter multiply its cells following an 
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